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 Page 1 Institutional Dysfunction, New Technologies and International 
Broadcasting 
 
New Technologies and International Broadcasting: Reflections on Adaptations and 
Transformations  
 
By Monroe E. Price, Susan Haas and Drew Margolin 
 
Abstract:  International broadcasters, like all media institutions, adjust to reflect the 
existence of new distribution technologies. Technological change is part of a new media 
landscape that has rendered older definitions and contexts of international broadcasting 
insufficient. The pace and extent of adjustment differs among the players. Adaptations 
range from the superficial to the highly integrative; and, on the other hand, from the 
merely adaptive to the pervasively transformative.   Can one compare, among 
institutions, how this process takes place and what factors influence the patterns of 
accommodation?  Theories of organizational structure shed light on which factors lead 
international broadcasters to which path.  This essay considers U.S. international 
broadcasting as a model to tease out some of these factors, among them organizational 
complexity, political influence and control and contradictions embedded in institutional 
purpose.  In this scenario, technological adaptation can mask a critical need to address 
institutional transformation.  
 
 
      
  
Introduction 
 
In the complex, contested and competitive setting of international broadcasting and 
public diplomacy, one question frequently reappears:  what role should new 
technologies play as established players adjust to a new environment.   All media—
commercial, public service, user-generated, communications for development—are 
rethinking structure and purposes because dramatic changes in delivery systems have 
become part of the strategic picture.  The invocation of “new technologies” is an 
obvious and appealing call to modernize, to come to grips with necessities and 
opportunities.  And it occurs at a time when there is a more intense effort to reach for 
“hearts and minds” and to influence public attitudes around the world.    
In this essay, we wish to turn the question of technology somewhat and to discuss 
what might be called the “organizational environs” in which technological choices are 
made and the implications of these choices for participation in a global market for 
loyalties.   It is an exploration, as it were, about the idiosyncratic context of international 
broadcasting organizations coping with norms of adaptation.  There’s a reason for this 
slight shift from the principal issues.  Processes of change are ongoing.  A snapshot of 
what various international broadcasters are doing would be helpful, but in this cauldron 
of change, it is more important to think about how decisions are made, and by whom, 
rather than which decision, adopting which technology, occurs.  Changes are so 
substantial that, as we briefly indicate, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate 
clearly the category of “international broadcaster” and the purposes assigned to its 
denizens.  Also, we, like others,  succumb to the tyranny of the category, asking how 
these particular players should or do use new technologies when their masters (the 
states, the legislatures, the rulers) might decide that new technologies generate such a 
different competitive playing field, that a wholly different kind of  team is necessary to 
enter into the competition. 
There are two additional caveats.  First, it is standard to say that an essay 
concerning international broadcasters is not about the message of public diplomacy or 
the actual foreign policies that are being pursued.  This disclaimer is most applicable for 
those international broadcasters who see their task as more purely the promulgation of 
news and related programming than the furtherance of a particular policy. Yet, as we 
shall see, the question of mission is important to the question of technological choice.  A 
second caveat is more poignant.  There should always be a realization that the pursuit of 
modernization and adaptation can become, itself, a form of escapism. Technology-ardor 
can be a siren song.  In some settings, the overwhelming possibility of technology can 
become a justification for torpor. The adoption of new technologies can be a cover for 
continued misconception of major problems, an occasion for weak, ineffective, perhaps 
counterproductive experimentation. As international broadcasters, like all media 
institutions, adjust to reflect the existence of new distribution technologies, the process 
of shifting can underscore and amplify the discrepancies in existing management styles 
and organization. Some understanding of these discrepancies, how this process of 
adaptation and transformation takes place in various settings is useful to examine.  
Rather than ask what each international broadcaster has done to absorb and take on 
technological challenges, the essay thus asks a more institutional question:  what is there 
about the organization, management structure, and geopolitical context of each entity 
that leads to one pattern of technological adjustment or another? 
For this reason it is more informative to look at what structural impediments 
there are to adventitious change among international broadcasters than to look at the 
specific changes themselves.  International broadcasters work, traditionally, with a huge 
array of audiences, in extraordinary environments, some of which are far from the 
modern.     More important for this essay, international broadcasters have widely 
different modes and apparatuses of decision-making than those of their commercial 
counterparts.  The result of different organizational forms may be different patterns of 
adjustment of goals to new technologies.   
While this essay is about international broadcasting and technology generally, it 
has a subfocus on the U.S. case and, in particular, the Broadcasting Board of Governors. 
Partly this is because there is disquiet that the U.S. players in this field are 
underperforming, that for some complex of reasons it is difficult to define a proper set of 
messages or it is difficult to disseminate them.  But it is partly practical.  It is somewhat 
easier for us to discuss what might be called the “organizational environs” in which 
international broadcasters make technological choices in the United States.  Ours is an 
experiment in exploration, as it were, of how to formulate questions about technology 
adaptations in the idiosyncratic context of international broadcasting organizations and 
the norms against which those adaptations might be viewed.     
The importance of and complexity of the international broadcasting task does not 
change the fact that international broadcasters are organizations and, as such, are subject 
to the same tendencies and logics that both sustain and inhibit other similar institutions.  
For these broadcasters, as for all media institutions, the adoption of new technologies 
can mask deficiencies in existing management styles and organization, as well as in a 
clear definition of purpose. At the same time, ineffective use of new technologies, or 
inappropriate decisions on which technologies to use, can underscore a notion of flailing 
and ineptitude rather than confidence and mastery.     
 
Defining International Broadcasting 
 
We have already suggested one of the implications of new technologies: namely 
to challenge the category of international broadcasting.  Thus, to set the organizational 
parameters in which the technology-adaptation choices are made, it will first be helpful 
to explore some definitions for international broadcasters, and to clarify what 
organizations we are talking about in this essay. International broadcasting has been  the 
elegant term for a complex combination of state-sponsored news, information and 
entertainment directed at a population outside the sponsoring state’s boundaries. It has 
largely meant the use of electronic media by one society to shape the opinion of the 
people and leaders of another. It involves what was once with pride called propaganda 
(Martin, 1958). This function is situated within a somewhat wider rubric now known as 
public diplomacy.1  
Although they are often overlooked, definitional characteristics are central to the 
question of technological change. Communication technologies and geopolitics blur 
distinctions once standard in international broadcasting: target audiences or populations 
are no longer corralled in contiguous territories or within state boundaries, yet 
organizations still carry the prior imprint.  Relevant organizations and their program 
content are not neatly categorized according to their relationships to national media 
systems and audiences. Newer satellite services are often linked to government or 
regional policy or funding but are not “state-sponsored” in a direct structural or 
governance sense. Al Jazeera is not, strictly speaking, an instrument of international 
broadcasting (its relationship to Qatar does not fit the textbook definition of broadcaster 
to government), but global practitioners of the craft recognize it as a keen competitor 
(Ajami, 2001). Although there are those who argue that CNN is an instrument of U.S. 
hegemony (either consciously or unconsciously), it is relatively far from being an 
international broadcaster in the precise meaning of the term (in terms of relationship to 
government, number of languages of broadcast, composition of the target audience).  
The very words “international broadcaster” embrace historic origins in a world 
where power was negotiated among neatly bounded states and “broadcasting” was 
conceived as messages constructed for delivery to mass audiences via radio, mostly 
shortwave. The increased availability of new ways of reaching audiences—Internet 
websites, satellite-to-home, audiocassettes, videotapes, blogs, podcasts—along with the 
increasingly mobile nature of media reception and use, make it clear that it is no longer 
sufficient to cabin the subject by distinct format or technologies of distribution. There is 
the challenge of reaching audiences no longer theoretically or materially conceived of as 
“mass” or passive or susceptible to message by one-way injection. There is the problem 
of establishing credibility in conversation with population groups distributed in 
diasporic networks across the globe. Most important for international broadcasters is the 
rise of non-governmental groups that rival states in the wielding of discursive or 
symbolic power via media and which deploy media locally and transnationally in pursuit 
of political goals. In terms of the global media industry, all media organizations from 
Doordarshan (the Indian national broadcaster) to the BBC, Al Manar, Al Jazeera and 
CNN are in some measure missionaries of ideological and cultural hegemony. These 
developments have rendered the term “international broadcaster” within the standard 
definitions insufficiently descriptive. 
And in a more vicious world, as the Cold War’s geopolitically distinct fields of 
contestation fade in favor of the porous borders and group networks of a newly 
conceptualized “Long War on Terror,” other defining features of international 
broadcasting blur as well. A line has traditionally been drawn between “international 
broadcasters” who were transparently such and who upheld a tradition of standing for 
objectivity and impartiality, and those engaged in persuasion through articulation of the 
position of the government.  Another distinction has existed between conventional 
international broadcasters and so-called “clandestine” or “black” radios, instruments of 
information transfer secretly sponsored by governments, intelligence agencies or state-
linked political movements. In the United States, international broadcasting is 
complicated by a further division. Historically, it has been linked to the Department of 
State, not the Department of Defense, but at times of strain that distinction, important for 
internal and external credibility, has been crossed. Distinctions exist also between 
services conceived as “surrogates,” such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 
Radio Free Asia (RFA) and its siblings, whereby language broadcast services produce 
news and other programs designed to show what free and independent media would be 
like in specific target societies, and a broadcast network that is more general, such as the 
Voice of America (VOA), designed to carry news of the world along with a portrayal of 
the United States. In fact, those distinctions have been reduced since 1999 when both 
families of broadcasters were brought under the auspices of the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors.   
Even a small degree of confusion in the definition of international broadcasting 
or in its purposes is one element that has a substantial impact on the broadcaster’s 
strategic decisions, including those concerning technology. The entity’s vision—for 
example, whether it sees itself as an objective news and information service, or whether 
it fashions a persuasive tilt by intent—will affect the strategy of reaching particular 
elites or other targeted population groups.    In turn, this strategy will have an impact on 
the technological choices that are made.  How one thinks about the particular role of the 
international broadcaster, how sponsoring governments (and other competitors) reach 
out to complex audiences, how governments in the receiving societies interact with the 
broadcasters, the nature of the competitive fray and the role of technologies in each of 
these: all these matters are up for debate. Engagement with new technologies is partly a 
consequence of response to these definitional challenges.   
There is a related point:  let us assume that the Internet and access to the Internet, 
though often skewed and digitally fatally divided, alter for many millions the way they 
receive news and information.  Even given the moderate blur in identifying what 
constitutes an international broadcaster, it is fair to ask how each of them seeks to cope 
with these new circumstances, which entity has established a beachhead in the 
competition to get the most “hits” or be the most read of various news sites.  One could 
look at a standard effort to measure this kind of impact (say through Alexa.com) and 
reach conclusions about France 24, BBC World Service and the Voice of America.  But 
for the strategist in a government, that question may be a slightly different, and more 
radical one:  given the array of new entrants (the unaffiliated bloggers, the attractive 
aggregators, the streaming and shifting of video, are the international broadcasters 
sufficiently adaptable, or are there other mechanisms more likely to make the best use of  
any particular  technology to reach public objectives (assuming they can be sufficiently 
defined)?  It may be that the picture of the universe we now have:  with  a  soft 
equilibrium among competing  news providers will become replicated with minor 
rankings of the  major players.  The comparative effectiveness of various players, 
commercial or quasi-commercial news entities,  will change, somewhat, but it will be 
roughly the same players who  count.    But it may be that in the competition for news 
site prominence, or other modes of influential entry, very different strategies must be 
employed and not all of the existing cast of international broadcasters can effectively 
enter the competition.  Perhaps there is something more like a winner-take-all outcome, 
and the issue is whether, in that context, other strategies, other ways of thinking about 
technologies, organization and mission, are important. 
 
Defining New Technologies 
 
Because of our emphasis on the institutional aspect—the context in which 
strategies are made—we tend to be catholic about the definition of “new technologies.” 
The task of international broadcasters (at least their stated task) is to reach target 
audiences effectively.  As a result, they have historically been innovative in exploring 
new devices, to improvise, to use technology to overcome obstacles of distance, 
topography, and, primarily, barriers imposed because of the resistance of governments in 
the target areas.  Technologies are “new,” in this sense, if a changing strategy facilitates 
expansion or reach and influence.  This definition incorporates, of course, the use of the 
Internet and the development of online sites as a kind of poster boy of new technologies.  
But this definition also would incorporate thinking through the reinvigoration of older 
modes—such as short-wave radio—in circumstances where other modes make effective 
delivery of information possible.  In that sense, institutional barriers to bringing new 
technologies to bear depend, to some extent, on the technologies themselves, so we must 
also clarify what we mean by “new technologies.”   
Just as an example, one could look at the technological changes affecting 
international broadcasting in the 1990s.  In part, this was characterized by a shift from 
reliance on traditional shortwave and mediumwave transmissions: an increasing number 
of individuals in target societies were turning to TV, the Internet and national and local 
FMs carrying relays of the international broadcasts tolerable to the host country. 
International broadcasters, like their domestic counterparts, have had to learn new skills 
and new modes of attracting attention (Olechowska & Howard, 1999, p.214-257).  The 
end of the Cold War made novel arrangements appealing and the capacity to gain 
carriage on local FM stations became evident.  In 1999, the then-chairman of the IBB’s 
Board of Governors, Marc Nathanson, captured the mood emerging in that decade: “The 
technology of short-wave is outmoded. We need to get into modern technology. Congress 
needs to fund it as we go to satellites, the Internet, and FM broadcasting.” (Hopkins, 
1999)  This is now the conventional wisdom. 
Television, not, by far, a new technology in the commercial sector, has become a  
more coveted mechanism for delivering international broadcasting than it was in the past.  
Yet international broadcasting remains substantially a radio service, and its approach to 
the visual is as if it were new.  First CNN’s entry in the 1990s, but more significantly Al 
Jazeera’s success, has shaken all assumptions about the ways to compete and stunned 
international broadcasters into considering wholly new approaches. The United States 
turned to a variety of video-related  efforts, most recently Al Hurra; the BBC did likewise 
and, as well, invested in an Arabic television channel; France introduced a joint public-
private news network, France 24.  Satellite radio has promise, but to date it 
predominantly means distribution of a signal by satellite to a terrestrial rebroadcaster. A 
great deal of planning and experimentation—along the lines of many  plans to bring 
satellite-based or mobile-based radio to  Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean—must be 
undertaken before more traditional means can be scuttled or supplanted for regularly and 
effectively distributing programs.  
 New technologies, particularly the Internet, but with a retroactive implication for 
all efforts, have radical implications for the style of delivery, not only its physical mode.  
With cable and satellite has come the fierce engine of multi-channel competition and the 
rise of niche audiences.  With the Internet and broadband has come the culture of 
interaction and user-originated content.  “New technologies” mean far more than 
reaching more people, reaching faster, penetrating through greater barriers.  It means, or 
generally compels a meaning, of altered modes of thinking through the relationship 
between the content provider (even that term can become quaint and outdated) and the 
audience.  In this way, new technologies beget a new media environment.  
 
 
The New Media Environment 
 
The power of new technologies has many institutions stirring, whether it is as a 
result of the rise of blogging, the international rise of interconnected segments of civil 
society or the various color revolutions of the past decade.  International broadcasters 
are participants in a larger community of media institutions that have a history of 
preoccupation with technological threats to their stability in the near distance (whether it 
is television against radio, cable versus broadcasting or satellite against cable).  All this 
generates fear: fear that something unknown, uncontrollable and hugely consequential is 
taking place, and that the broadcaster is not a part of it. This fear helps drive, for some,  
the search for new technologies. Commercial entities rise or fall depending, in part, on 
how they play the game of adjusting to new technologies.   Failing at choosing the right 
technologies can mean falling out of touch with one’s audience, becoming distant from 
one’s market.   
The fierce debate over what technologies to deploy, how much to invest and how 
to utilize the new mechanisms is a universal one.  Like every major commercial and 
public service media enterprise, international broadcasters know they must adjust or 
they will wither. The institutional environment for change at commercial organizations 
is different from that of international broadcasters in terms of pressures, culture of 
management, and pace of and incentives for change.  The international broadcasters and 
related entities are both more protected and more vulnerable: They are comforted by 
political or governmental protection (or subject to its whims), but, as a result, may lack 
the context and discipline to organize for necessary, large-scale change. 
A perception of fear, and the related crisis in management, is illustrated in a 
February 2006 speech by then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2006). “Our federal government,” he said, “is really only beginning 
to adapt our operations to the 21st century. For the most part, the U.S. government still 
functions as a five and dime store in an eBay world.”  Rumsfeld was not differentiating 
between public diplomacy (in the broad sense) and international broadcasting, nor 
among the various players.  He was enveloping.  For Rumsfeld, the “war on terror” or 
the conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere had become “the first war in history—
unconventional and irregular as it may be—in an era of e-mails, blogs, cell phones, 
Blackberrys, Instant Messaging, digital cameras, a global Internet with no inhibitions, 
talk radio, 24-hour news broadcasts, satellite television.”  What concerned him was that 
“Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media age, but for the 
most part we, our country, our government, has not adapted.”  To make this an issue of 
merely using new technologies would be too simple.  According to Rumsfeld, the 
“violent extremists” have proven to be highly successful at manipulating the opinion 
elites of the world. “They plan and design their headline-grabbing attacks using every 
means of communication to intimidate and break the collective will of free people. They 
know that communications transcend borders and that a single news story handled 
skillfully can be as damaging to our cause and helpful to theirs as any other method of 
military attack. And they’re doing it. They’re able to act quickly. They have relatively 
few people. They have modest resources compared to the vast and expensive 
bureaucracies of Western governments.”  Mere adaptation of new technologies, 
according to this perspective, is not sufficient. Instead, “we ought to ask ourself the 
question: What should a U.S. Information Agency or a Radio Free Europe for the 21st 
century look like?…These are tough questions and it’s tough to find the answers for 
them and to do it right so that we can tell our hard-working folks what to do to meet 
these challenges.”   
Rumsfeld’s speech is important, for this essay,  not because of the speaker, not 
because it was frank, but because it implicated current management policies in the 
failure of key institutions to “adapt to a new media age.” Rumsfeld underscored that 
technology might have a place in an overall radical rethinking of the institutions 
involved, but asserted the institutional weaknesses that brought about the failure. He was 
identifying a general malaise.2  This was a rather radical perspective on the gulf between 
need and achievement.  Its intensity and sweeping quality may not be relevant 
everywhere.  But it raises important questions about information asymmetry, means of 
delivery, responsiveness and organization.  It raises questions about the need for 
institutions to alter, adapt and transform in a new competitive environment. 
 
 
Structural Forces 
  
This brings us to the main question of the essay:  how to think about the institutional 
context in which these technology-related questions are determined.  In Good to Great, 
James Collins (2001) and his team compare 11 pairs of companies, each from the same 
industry or market, over a period of 20 years or so.  At the start of the study period, each 
company was a mediocre performer; by the end, one company in each pair had become a 
top performer while the other was still middle of the pack at best.  Collins’ detailed 
qualitative research concluded there were several key factors to these successful 
transformations.  A key determinant for us is that without a redefinition of organizational 
purposes (and those of its constituent parts) as well as an examination of existing 
strengths and weaknesses, exploitations of new technologies will be less than optimal.  
“When used right, technology becomes an accelerator of momentum, not a creator of it.  
The good-to-great companies never began their transitions with pioneering technology, 
for the simple reason that you cannot make good use of technology until you know which 
technologies are relevant.“ (Collins, 2001, pp.152-153) Another way to put the question 
is to ask about competing modes of introducing new technologies for what Barley (1986) 
calls the “structuring of organizational worlds.” 
 
To understand the problem, one can describe two types of behavior as 
institutions approach new technologies: adaptations and transformations.  Adaptations 
can be bifurcated. In “integrative adaptation,” technology does not radically alter the 
function of the entity, but is used to perform the traditional tasks in a more complete and 
efficient manner.  Other adaptations are more superficial and serve primarily a 
legitimizing function, allowing an institution to present a modern face to external 
entities. Institutional theory predicts that adaptations of this sort—merely updating and 
adapting in the normative and acceptable way—yield shortcomings, mask weakness and 
postpone inevitable, more organizationally transcendent, change.     
The alternative to adaptation, in the organizational literature, is “transformation.”  
Whereas adaptations are primarily surface-level reorganizations that may actually be 
harmful to an institution’s survival by postponing confrontation with foundational 
issues, transformations may be defined as reorganizations that actually come to grips 
with such fundamental changes (Freeman & Hannan, 1989).  Transformations can be 
convulsive, involving reductions in staff or substantial modifications in the bureaucracy 
(though layoffs are not a guarantee that a transformation has taken place).3  Some 
international broadcasting entities, like many organizations, have a model of operation 
that enables them to function with apparent effectiveness even when they are on the 
verge of failure. There is an external shell of adequacy of performance.   These 
organizations are most likely to undertake superficial adaptations.4   
Theories of organizational structure thus provide guidance as to underlying 
forces that might help us understand the actions of U.S. international broadcasters as 
they seek to absorb new technologies. “Ecological theorists” argue that most 
organizations come into being to match the environment in which they are launched; 
when the environment changes, they decline and are replaced by others, a “life cycle” of 
corporate life (Adizes, 1988).  There are fortunate exceptions, including those 
organizations that are large enough to buy or acquire the potential challengers and 
incorporate them into their structure, as well as jettison old divisions.  However, 
ecologists doubt the capacity of organizations to transform.   
Organizational theory also outlines the tendency for bureaucracies to lionize their 
own norms and adapt themselves into homogeneity (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983).  Institutions survive and persist, theorists claim, because they adapt by 
embedding themselves within structures that have apparent legitimacy, rather than 
welcome redefinition in new circumstances. In terms of technology adoption, this means 
that international broadcasting entities engage in technology adoption partly to perform 
better, but partly because of a set of expectations. Patterns of adaptation (for example, the 
development of a website or the introduction of web-casting) reflect the expectations of 
the entity’s overseers—in the United States, the BBG and Congress—with the result 
being dominance of political or short-term criteria, and criteria that do not reflect wholly 
the needs of the receiving or the imparting society.  
Looking at international broadcasters, we take a more moderate but related 
position, that their structures will inhibit transformation unless a strengthened and 
clarified mission is conceived. This is consistent with our view that, in general, structural 
problems limit organizations to modest adaptations, and, further, that no managerial crisis 
has sufficiently encouraged international broadcasters to veer substantially from existing 
patterns, though, of course, patterns vary.  Much more would need to be known in the 
way of comparing structures of governance of international broadcasters to make a 
convincing case concerning this argument.  Only with such greater familiarity would one 
know when technological improvements are merely symptom-masking drugs that divert 
policy  attention from the need for transformation or impede transformative impulses. 
 
 Adaptations and Transformations 
 
Every international broadcaster presents its own case of adaptation and 
transformation.  Each has its own structure, its own history, its own relationship to 
political masters.  As a result, from an institutional standpoint, there are great differences 
in terms of the mode by which each international broadcaster can take on the task of 
assessing technological possibilities and seizing those that will render it more capable of 
achieving strategic objectives.  We would label as a “dysfunction” structural impediments 
that restrict clear focusing on the relationship between technology and objective.  The 
capacity to have strong executive leadership with relatively clear goals, about which there 
is a sufficient consensus, is part of a stable framework, including the  environment in 
which the international broadcaster functions.   The BBC World Service has had, for 
example, the immense benefit of synergies with the BBC itself and the capacity to use the 
extraordinarily successful bbc.co.uk news portal.  It is not only new technologies 
themselves, but additional opportunities for cross-promotion and branding that have 
provided the World Service with new strategies.    
 A second rather obvious point about the environment for change complicates the 
issue.  Adjustments within international broadcasters are certainly the  function of 
technological possibilities, internal budget priorities and geopolitical change. But  
technological change brings with it transformed modes of thinking about the medium.  
The current round of new technologies, especially the Internet, has caused a shift in the 
relationship between the viewer or listener and the producer.  As we have already 
suggested, “interactivity” or audience participation and even more effective control 
becomes a new touchstone of programming approach.  Given the strong tradition of 
hierarchy in international broadcasting, in which control over message could be said to be 
a key aspect of the approach to provide information to needy listeners, the cultural 
change is great.  Different international broadcasters may, using the adjustment to new 
technologies as a lever, have differing abilities to adjust here as well. The World Service, 
for example, seems to have multiplied its interactive practices and more solidly and 
consistently brought listeners into the process of contributing content—bringing old 
technologies into a new media environment.  Developing from the experience of the BBC 
itself, the BBC World Service inaugurated its “Have Your Say” program and website, 
connecting audiences across the globe on major issues, provoking debate with an 
apparent immediacy.  One of its editors claimed that “Our programme belongs to our 
audience. They set the agenda, either through comments posted on our blog, or their 
blogs, through texts, emails and calls. There’s an important underlying principle here. 
Our belief is that people don’t want to interact with a corporation, they want to interact 
with each other, and World Have Your Say provides the daily forum for them to be able 
to do that” (BBC World Service.com n.d.). 
 Canada’s international broadcaster’s dramatic reduction in service and 
repurposing has been an example of considering the influence of new technologies in a 
new media environment.  There, the consequence was a substantial downsizing and 
repurposing of Radio Canada International.  Since 2006, in a radical revision of function 
using new technology, Radio Canada International has been operating RCI Viva, on the 
Internet, as an information service for recent immigrants to Canada.  In the late 1990s, 
CBC, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, had already discontinued its funding of 
RCI; a first transformation was to shift the service to serve and promote Canada’s 
economic interests around the world.  The interaction of market-altered technological 
frameworks and sources of funding have led to the current mix of functions for 
Germany’s Deutsche Welle. In late 1994, Deutsche Welle became an innovator among  
public broadcasters in Germany in terms of a World Wide Web presence evolving into 
the current site that offers daily exclusive coverage in  core languages (Arabic, Chinese, 
English, German, Spanish, Portuguese [for Brazil], Farsi and Russian) as well as a 
mixture of news and information in 23 other languages corresponding to Deutsche 
Welle's radio programs. 5 
 
America’s Al Hurra was established to attract audiences through formats using 
new technologies, but it has mirrored traditional approaches in terms of content.  Radio 
Sawa, on the other hand, took a traditional technology, radio, and transformed content. In 
our vocabulary, Al Hurra is adaptive and Radio Sawa is potentially transformative.  This 
is not a reflection of the merits of either effort, but rather a comment on the nature of the 
institutional step by the international broadcaster involved.  Not surprisingly, Radio Sawa 
has been subject to more criticism from within the international broadcasting 
establishment than Al Hurra.  Al Hurra is criticized as a faltering effort that has the 
trappings of innovation, though statistically valid studies of impact have yet to be 
completed.   Professor William Rugh is not atypical in noting that that  
 
a common Arab reaction that I have heard is disappointment that Al Hurra 
is not effective as a newsgathering agency in the Middle East. ... Arab 
viewers assumed that since the United States is the occupying power in 
Iraq, and Al Hurra is the American government’s television channel, Al 
Hurra should be in the best position of any broadcaster to have the best 
and quickest access to news events in Iraq, but it does not. Al Hurra’s 
potential advantage in this competitive market has been lost. (U.S. Senate 
Committee, 2004)   
 
Al Hurra has been criticized almost from every vantage point and a frequent 
conclusion, perhaps premature, has been that it has not gained traction with viewers. 6  
Radio Sawa, on the other hand, has reported surprisingly large audience share in many of 
its markets (though these figures have been disputed on methodological grounds).  Sawa 
radically altered the usual international broadcasting feed, focusing on popular music for 
most of the format, with a relatively small amount of news.  It seemed to gain audience in 
the demographic it most sought, but was said by many not to impart, sufficiently, the 
message that U.S. broadcasting is charged with transmitting.  It was a major threat to the 
historic modes used by U.S. international broadcasters: popular music aimed at young 
audiences had been featured among language service programs in the past to great 
success, but news had been paramount.  Sawa’s all-music, every hour format (with 
interspersed news) appeared almost heretical given the mission’s previous interpretation 
in terms of information delivery.  The outcome of all of this is not yet known.  
 
A Case Study:  the BBG and the Voice of America 
 
 We have asserted that each traditional international broadcaster—and the broader 
class of entities  that compete for audiences—presents its own institutional environment 
for making decisions concerning the uses of new technologies or the readaptation of old 
ones. While it is not possible, in this essay, to describe elements of institutional context in 
enough international broadcasters to have a convincing set of comparisons, we can try to 
demonstrate how to think about this question with a specific example. We focus on one 
example of a context for change, namely the US Broadcasting Board of Governors 
(BBG) and its flagship, the Voice of America.   We do so because of proximity of 
material and because the case illustrates important lessons in the relationship between 
structure—the institutional composition of international broadcasting in the United States 
relates closely to its special structure and definition by Congress, the Broadcasting Board 
of Governors and other agencies—and capacity to change. 
 We look at mission statements and reviews as an important window into the 
process of institutional adjustment to new technologies and examine certain of the 
documents produced between 2002 and 2007 by the BBG, the General Accounting Office 
(GAO), the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Congress and others, including critics, 
as indicators of how the BBG, and particularly the Voice of America, deal with issues of 
adaptation and transformation.   These documents are part of a non-choreographed paper 
discourse on the future of international broadcasting and its relationship to new 
technologies.  Most official discourse of this kind is coded and not sufficiently explicit, 
and this set of exchanges is little different.  But running through these documents is some 
notion of unresolved conflicts of direction and planning; there is an expressed 
dissatisfaction, either because of a perceived departure from an earlier ideal or because of 
a sense of inadequacy of current performance—or both. We are interested in how the 
contradictions revealed by this analysis might inhibit useful organizational 
transformations as they relate to deployment of new technologies.   
A starting point is one of the inventions of the BBG, its 2002 – 2007 strategic 
planning document, called “Marrying the Mission to the Market.” (Broadcasting Board of 
Governors, 2002). Among the stated strategic goals and objectives were: 
 
Goal I – Design a Broadcasting Architecture for the 21st Century. 
• Create the Worldwide U.S. International Broadcasting System 
• Realign the BBG Organizational Structure 
 
Goal III -- Employ Modern Communication Techniques and Technologies 
• Accelerate Multi-media Development, Infusing More TV and Internet into the 
Mix 
• Adopt the Principles and Practices of Modern Radio “Formatics” 
• Control the Distribution Channels that Audiences Use 
• Drive Innovation and Performance with Research 
 
Goal V – Revitalize “Telling America’s Story” to the World 
• Be a Model of a Free Press and Democracy in Action 
• Concentrate on Those Aspects of America that Research Tells Us Interest 
Individual Audiences 
• Present Targeted Editorials that are Relevant to Local and Regional Concerns 
• Use Formats, Presentation Techniques, and On-air Presence that Will Appeal to 
Audiences 
• Maximize Interactive Use of the Internet as a Ready Reference Source for 
Presidential Speeches and Other Vital Documents 
  
The problem—portrayed, but not clarified in these goals—is what constitutes “the 
mission,” what constitutes “the market,” and how “marrying” the mission to the market 
will be accomplished. This is in some ways a political document, not one to be parsed 
exactly as a guide to action.  But the “strategic goals” are an index to the conflicting 
pressures that make it difficult to draw priorities.  Is the “mission” to “provide accurate 
and objective news” or, in the BBG’s support of U.S. foreign policy, “tell America’s 
story to the world,” or, in a third iteration, shape a strategy that supports public 
diplomacy efforts to shift attitudes and opinions about the United States? What happens 
when the compatibility or incompatibility of these goals is called into question and 
international broadcasters face demands that are in conflict with one another? The BBG 
acknowledged that “The challenge facing the Broadcasting Board of Governors is to 
discern how to reach large audiences in complex, competitive media environments 
worldwide with straight news as well as perspectives on American culture and 
information on official U.S. government positions and policies.” (Broadcasting Board of 
Governors, 2002, p.34)  Without a consensus of sorts on these questions, the issue of how 
to use technologies becomes muffled and imprecise.   
The challenge can be seen in the GAO’s evaluation of the BBG’s strategy: 
 
“Marrying the Mission to the Market,” … emphasizes the need to reach 
large audiences by applying modern broadcast techniques and 
strategically allocating resources to focus on high-priority broadcast 
markets, such as the Middle East. However, … this plan lacked a long-
term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board’s 
success in increasing audience size. Further, there were no measurable 
program objectives to support the plan’s strategic goals or to provide a 
basis for assessing the Board’s performance with regard to changing 
audience views toward the United States. (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2004, p. 3) 
 
The list of challenges facing the BBG included: “outmoded programs and poor signal 
quality; the disparate structure of the agency, which consists of seven separate broadcast 
entities and a mix of federal and grantee organizations collectively managed by a part-
time Board; and the resource-intensive job of broadcasting 97 language services to more 
than 125 broadcast markets worldwide. (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004, 
p. 4) 
In terms of Goal I,  creating a “worldwide U.S. international broadcasting system” 
sounds like an important opening for thinking through the use of technologies, but little 
in that document came to grips with how such an aggregate of entities would become a 
system or the role of technology in this process. There is a reference to the overlapping, 
parallel and potential conflicts in certain markets of the Voice of America and RFE/RL, 
but a promise to make them a single stream does not overcome the intense political 
realities that underlie their separation.   Nor is there an indication of how “realigning” the 
BBG would negotiate or mitigate old political and constituency barriers.   Understanding 
the constraints, the document states that “Any adjustments will build on current practice, 
so the degree of change will be moderate.” This rhetorical position keeps the peace 
internally—among broadcasters operating under the historic VOA model and the grantee 
surrogate domestic broadcasters in the tradition of RFE/RL, concerned about radical 
change, such as suggestions of mergers or elimination of one model or the other. It fends 
off Congressional funders fearful of radical change. But such rhetoric also operates 
materially within the organization to sanction superficial adaptation rather than rewarding 
impulses toward transformation.  
Goal III speaks directly to new technology but provides no real guidance  on 
how new techniques should be integrated and balanced with the old, an omission that is 
particularly significant in light of increasing budget pressures and changing strategic 
priorities.  The BBG asserted that “radio will remain the backbone of our 
communications,” though it recognized that “for some broadcast languages, TV and the 
Internet have strong roles to play as well.”  The finding became partial justification for 
reducing English-language radio services on the basis that new technologies will be 
more effective.   
When it comes to websites, the BBG has stated that “We have seen spotty 
progress towards the goal of having all language services create high quality news-
oriented websites. Some are outstanding. The content of others is thin in content and 
visually uninteresting. Bottom line: We will ensure that all the entities have world-class 
Internet presences” (Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2002, p. 37).  But is “bottom line” 
more than a slogan?  A world-class Internet presence has been achieved by both public 
and private broadcasters: BBC.com and CNN.com.  In the case of the United States, 
separate branding strategies for international broadcasters remain an inconvenient barrier 
to global success. 
Although Goal III defines audience research as “the life’s blood of 
broadcasting,” the BBG’s performance indicators promote disguising technological 
adaptations as well. Though the BBG makes countless pronouncements about strategic 
vision, until recently the BBG focused heavily on a single measure of performance—
cost per unduplicated weekly audience reach.  Weekly audience reach is a standard 
brought forward over time from the radio industry. The BBG utilizes this metric as a 
longer-term measure, setting performance targets for annual reductions in the cost per 
unduplicated weekly audience member; costs were slated to decline by pennies per year 
through 2009. 
The primacy afforded this “lowest unit cost” mentality grounds strategy and 
operations in an outdated industrial management model: the production of flows of 
information and programming channeled via discrete broadcast technologies intended 
for individual audience members who interact with products in only one way. In other 
words, audience size is conceived in terms of technology of reception—radio, TV and 
Internet, for example—that does not acknowledge a dynamic media environment in 
which consumers interact with information via multiple media: a radio listener who 
relays to television or to the Internet for a live story, links to and forwards information to 
others online or by cell phone, and engages in commentary is equated with a radio-only 
audience member. The generation of heightened engagement is not accounted for in 
evaluating the effectiveness (as audience reach) of radio or TV as impetus for Internet 
site use. In other words, because most Internet users of VOA gain access to the system 
first via radio or TV, for example, they are not “unduplicated” and therefore their 
audience status as Internet users, at least in some modes of reckoning, was muted, if 
counted at all. This encouraged BBG broadcasters to employ new technology in a 
rudimentary but highly visible way, where each distribution technology (radio, TV, 
Internet) must be matched solely to a distinctly identifiable audience.7  
Underlying these issues, and influencing the BBG’s difficulty in defining a 
mission and engaging in transformation, are questions of structure. Ironically, the 
elements that were designed to strengthen international broadcasting in the United States 
have weakened its capacity to act strategically. The Broadcasting Board of Governors 
was designed, in its own words, “to protect the professional independence and integrity 
of the BBG broadcasters”—to maintain the traditional journalistic firewall between news 
production and external interference. Because of the nature of the appointment process, 
however, the “buffer” itself has channeled political intervention.  
Questions about the firewall are related to the underlying purpose of the various 
segments of the BBG. The interest and zeal of Congress in seeing its own definition of 
objectives and methods of achieving those objectives have not abated, with intervention 
going beyond the strategic. Soon after 9/11, it became tolerated and almost acceptable for 
individual members of Congress to suggest limits as to which voices and sources could 
be heard in VOA newscasts (Taliban spokespersons, for example); the mood of 
Washington led to further self-examination and self-censorship when editors determined 
what might approach an ideal of objectivity in the news.8 And in 2002, during a time 
marked by increased fissures in the firewall, the President appointed as chairman of the 
board of the BBG Kenneth Tomlinson, who was generally expected to be a reliable hand 
in ensuring  that segments of the enterprise interpreted “accurate and objective” in a 
manner favorable to the Administration. The State Department and Defense Department 
have played a role both directly and through the Board, rendering more complex the 
process of achieving strategic objectives.   
The organizational pattern has also weakened the power of broadcaster (as 
opposed to Board) management.  The Broadcasting Board of Governors provides a 
complex and difficult model for governance.  Because Board membership is usually 
evenly divided between the two major political parties (with an extra ex-officio seat 
reserved for the Secretary of State giving one more seat to the party in power), it is 
difficult for the board to agree on a strategic vision, despite its pronouncements.  This 
structural complexity means that the BBG can gain consensus only over very limited 
points. This serves the tenets of institutional theory, which would suggest that the few 
accepted practices, such as measuring accountability by cost per unduplicated user, take 
on too much sway. 
In the case of the BBG, the structural impediments to technological 
transformation are illustrated by its difficulties responding to criticisms in a 2004 report 
by Ernst & Young. In response to Ernst & Young’s suggestions, the BBG consolidated its 
technology functions in one entity, the International Broadcasting Bureau’s Office of 
Engineering and Technical Services. Problems, however, remained. An October 2006 
Office of the Inspector General report (Broadcasting Board of Governors OIG, 2006)  
stated that the consolidation effort, while accomplished at a surface or operational level, 
“did not go far enough in strengthening BBG’s technology focus” (Broadcasting Board of 
Governors OIG, 2006, p.12); the BBG was found to continue to lag in “Internet 
technologies and television.” (Broadcasting Board of Governors OIG, 2006, p.6)   The 
OIG found that the Office of Engineering and Technology Services, like other BBG 
entities, was resource-poor:  
 
That lack of resources demonstrates the subordinate nature of the Internet 
as a news medium within BBG. Coupled with the philosophical impasse 
between VOA and Internet Services [of the IBB’s Office of Engineering 
and Technology Services], the lack of emphasis on the Internet creates a 
challenge for BBG to remain competitive with other major news outlets 
for audience share. ... The board of directors and senior managers must 
regard IT as the BBG’s foundation and come to see the Internet as a core 
means of accomplishing the BBG’s mission. (Broadcasting Board of 
Governors OIG, 2006, p.32)   
 
Again, there have been surface modifications as a result of this ongoing conversation 
among internal and external entities evaluating organizational performance and strategy. 
However, the overall structural issues—rooted in unresolved conflicts of mission—
remain unaddressed (Hope & Hope, 1997). 
The complex BBG architecture is a response to political realities at the time of the 
abolition of the United States Information Agency, in 1999, but as an ensemble, and as 
related to present-day needs, the structure might be an obstacle to a coherent technology 
strategy, not an aid to fulfillment. This is hardly a paper on management techniques.  But 
there is overwhelming indication of dysfunction in the existing structures of U.S. 
international broadcasting.  Congress creates the BBG as a means to maintain a firewall, 
but also generates fire; from the Executive Branch there is the rhetoric of objectivity 
alongside the fact of political interference. There are multiple broadcast entities whose 
governance is dictated not by current functional needs but by historic circumstances. 
Projects designed to have external and international effects are governed by individuals 
who seem answerable less to the urgencies of those goals than to the demands of 
domestic constituencies.   
Booz Allen Hamilton, in its consultant report to the BBG, has summarized the 
situation in this manner: 
 
The current IBB/VOA structure is stovepiped by function; closely-related 
functions have separate reporting lines in practice. Managers often make 
operational decisions without adequate understanding of the upstream and 
downstream impact and cost. The number of official management layers 
slows decisions and has generated a practice of side-stepping formal 
reporting chains in order to get things done in a more timely way. The 
combination of unclear management roles/authorities and operating 
processes that are not standardized causes extra effort, negotiation, and 
friction at the front-line level. We concluded that the current 
organizational structure is unnecessarily complex and hinders the 
effectiveness of the enterprise…. VOA lacks the ability to operationalize 
its decisions, as key elements in its resources and delivery processes are 
effectively in a separate chain of management. (Booz Allen Hamilton, 
2006)  
 
There is a kind of tragedy to this analysis.  In the best of worlds, organizations 
have life cycles: periods of productivity and periods of decline.  As an “ecological” 
perception of these entities would have it, resisting the momentum of an ongoing cycle is 
extremely difficult.  The process of resistance and rejuvenation requires a much clearer 
vision and a much clearer sense of organization and management than appears to be the 
case at some elements of the BBG.   
What do we learn from this case study and what more should we try to know and 
understand?  We see that the “organizational environs” for each international broadcaster 
is fairly specific to its national context.  The specific concatenation at the BBG, a result 
of the demise of the United States Information Service, the rhythm of neglect and then 
intense interest in the function of international broadcasting, the hyper-pressure of the 
post-September 11 world, the specific role of Congress, the State Department and the  
Department of  Defense—these may have counterparts elsewhere but are not duplicated.  
And we believe that only by understanding such a context can choices about technology 
adaptation be understood.  But we can also see that looking only through the BBG lens is 
insufficient.  If we are asking how the BBG responds, our approach is on track.  If, 
however, the issue is how the government adapts to new technology, we might have to 
look at a far broader array of actions.  The BBG, functioning as a system administrator, 
might and does use technology choices to alter the balance among members of the 
family, and to change dramatically the way a particular entity operates.  At a level 
removed from that—Congress or the White House—the decision could be made that new 
technologies call for investments in entities outside the BBG group, say in increasing 
media assistance to “free” the Internet or subsidize private entrants into the field of 
satellite-delivered news and politics.   
 
 Technologies, International Broadcasters and the Market for Loyalties 
 
International broadcasting, at its core, is about the behavior of states in various 
markets for loyalties; that expands to include entities other than states. Knowledge 
influences action, and key international players have various concerns as to what those 
around the world “need to know” with the goal of affecting short-term or long-term 
behavior.   Great powers—those who try to shape the allegiances of large masses, 
domestically and internationally, use law, technology, force, and subsidy to maintain the 
strength of particular perspectives, often ones that that buttress or weaken political 
systems. And they use the power of information.  Why governments intervene to alter 
information in target societies is not centrally the subject of this essay.  But international 
broadcasting can be seen as a set of external efforts, largely, but not exclusively, by 
governments, to break through cartels that control the flow of words and ideas within 
markets.   Why outside entities seek to alter such cartels and provide information 
assembled from culturally, politically distinct and alternative points of view has its 
altruistic and its national interest aspects and sometimes, but not always, the two are 
conjoined.  Technology is important because it provides devices or techniques for 
surmounting barriers to entry.  How effectively international broadcasters and their 
competition adjust  or adopt to new technological possibilities, how well they use existing 
ones, how flexible  they are—all this will determine how well they cope with  the 
situation presented to them by specific constraints on the flow of information in a target 
or receiving state. In that sense, technologies (technologies of freedom in de Sola Pool’s 
phrase) are modes of privileging the reception rights of individuals against the efforts of 
the target state at shaping and delimiting the scope, character and content of information 
available. 
We have indicated how the existence of political  barriers create pressures for 
innovation.  And the pressure for innovation can be for old or recycled technologies as it 
well as for the latest fashion.  Audiocassettes were the subversive technology to defeat 
state restrictions in pre-revolutionary Iran.  Shortwave has had its role and may have a 
similar role again with the revival of repressive regimes.  Or, to take a different example, 
Al Jazeera becomes more productive and inventive than others in its use of video 
streaming and Internet websites because of impediments imposed formally or informally 
on diffusion of its product.  The plethora of satellites and the lowering of cost and 
technical barriers to entry in the direct satellite-to-home or satellite-to-cable market 
helped created an environment that encouraged the establishment of state-sponsored 
signals designed to persuade and to reach diasporas abroad.    Supply of opportunities has 
fostered a demand already kindled by shifts in the geopolitical context.  Now the 
Internet—home for insurrectionist, guerrilla, civil society and state sponsored sites, 
further indicates the relationship of access opportunities to demand. 
   But it is not enough that there are incentives to innovate.  The organizational 
context for innovation is equally important.  Al Jazeera can pioneer and quickly advance 
because of its organizational structure, security of financial support, lines of authority and 
clarity of purpose.  The BBC World Service has built-in advantages in terms of the 
historic role and financial base of the BBC itself.     Drawing on Pierre de Chardin, 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt  use the concept of the noosphere to portray “an expanding realm 
where the emphasis is on the ideational and organizational dimensions, without ignoring 
the technological one.” The noosphere “inclines the analyst and the strategist to think in 
terms of the roles of ideas, values, and norms, rather than in terms of Internet hosts, Web 
sites, and baud rates — that is, in terms of structural information rather than in terms of 
information processing.” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1999) 
The performance of international broadcasting is, undoubtedly, related to 
complexities of foreign policy and their relationship to the current geopolitical 
environment. But it is also, as we have tried to show, a function of the structure of 
international broadcasters as institutions and organizations operating in a withering 
management ecology.  Ultimately, this essay is descriptive of the dilemmas for 
policymakers and legislators rather than prescriptive of any particular attitude towards 
international broadcasting and new technologies. We have tried to suggest how 
institutional challenges that affect most organizations have specific resonance for those 
that operate within the structures of international broadcasting.  We have tried to place 
the discourse about particular international broadcasters and the larger mission within 
these institutional constraints particularly as they seek to adapt or transform using new 
technologies as part of that adaptation or transformation. And we have tried to suggest 
why improvements in technology—seemingly so obvious a place to start in evaluating 
change among international broadcasters—may prove to be not only false indicators of 
improvement but also the means by which entities continue to be diverted from the 
transformative self-examination critical to the success of  public diplomacy. 
This essay began with a question about technologies and ended with questions 
about missions,  strategies and life cycles of organizations.  The issues of structure are 
important because technologies and their uses shift so quickly.  Now it is not only cable 
and satellite that provide new opportunities, and it is not only the questions about the 
Internet, its uses and restrictions that pose problems for international broadcasters.  There 
are the new worlds of MySpace, Second Life and whatever is next on the idiosyncratic, 
hyperbolic and unpredictable  communications horizon.  It is the sheer variety of 
possibilities that calls for an organizational approach that is flexible and dynamic.  As 
styles change of seeking, constructing, distributing, receiving and interacting with 
information and of considering what constitutes credibility and integrity, it will be more 
and more important to have the capacity to shift.  Transformation lies more in 
conceptions of mission and its fulfillment, rather than in the adaptation, superficially, of 
the benefits of technological advance.  
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1 There’s an objection to linking public diplomacy and international broadcasting.   “Journalistic purists” 
among international broadcasters wish to link the venture (or at least some practitioners) to “objective 
coverage” with as little instrumental purpose and political guidance as possible.  This is one of the 
structural ambiguities that leads to difficulty. 
2 A talk by Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes, in contrast, contained these low 
expectation comments at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2006.  “Technology,” she noted, “is 
probably one of our biggest challenges and we’ve got a long way to go.  Government does not tend to 
                                                                                                                                                 
be a trend leader; they tend to be a trend lagger.  And so we have to be better about technology and 
we’re working to do so and that’s one of the things I’ve charged our Bureau of International 
Information Programs with looking at ways that we could use things like MP3 players to deliver 
messages or text messaging or to improve the quality.  We’ve got a couple of new web-based programs 
that we’re trying to become more active and engaged on the Internet.”  It is unfair to characterize a set 
of policies on a few comments, but this is an example of grudging adaptation for institutional 
legitimation of change. Karen Hughes, Comments at Council on Foreign Relations, May 10, 2006. 
http://www.state.gov/r/us/66098.htm (Accessed June 5, 2007). 
3 Of course, it would be foolish to contend that radical transformation is always the way forward, and there 
are cautions. Professor William Rugh, commenting on the introduction of a new international 
broadcasting satellite service to serve the Middle East, argued, “Something urgently needs to be done to 
help bridge the great gap between American and Arab perceptions. We are in a serious war of ideas.”  
 
[I]t would be more cost-effective to devote the funds used for television broadcasting 
to other badly needed public diplomacy programs. The most effective public 
diplomacy for Arab audiences involves dialogue by Americans willing to listen and 
able to explain the United States and its policies. Instead of trying to manage our own 
television channel, we should do more to gain access to the existing Arab channels, 
and we should increase the number of trained professional officers with Arabic 
language capabilities who can explain America and its policies using Arab media. 
The 9/11 terrorists used our planes to kill our people. We should be able to use Arab 
media to inform and educate Arab audiences. 
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